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Introduction 
Over the past few decades, strides have been made toward understanding how higher-level 
cognitive processes are mediated by neuronal spiking activity. Neuronal correlates of functions 
such as attention, executive control, working memory, decision-making, and reward processing 
have all been elucidated, to an impressive level of detail, at the single cell and circuit levels. This 
explosion in neuroscience-based discovery has depended crucially on nonhuman animal (animal, 
hereafter) models of the behaviors and processes under question. Developing animal models 
becomes a greater challenge for cognitive functions that approach the complexity of those 
arguably unique to humans. 
A prime example is metacognition. As reviewed in the Foundations of metacognition 
section of this volume, we know that humans engage in complex metacognitive behaviors. A 
metacognitive process is by definition about one of our own cognitive process, and is often 
referred to as “thinking about thinking”. Hence it is not surprising that metacognition is often 
associated with our subjective or conscious sense of self (e.g. Nelson 1996). Beyond the human 
brain, evidence for metacognition is less clear. There is, as yet, no definitive evidence that 
animals experience a subjective awareness, or a continuity of mental experience, similar to our 
own. Consequently, many investigators conclude that animals must not possess metacognition as 
humans do. Recent behavioral evidence, however, makes a case for some degree of 
metacognitive capability in a variety of animal species.  
Early attempts to test animals’ metacognitive skills used paradigms that analyzed 
relatively simple metacognitive behaviors. Subsequent single neuron studies have followed suit 
by developing streamlined tasks that are quick in duration, austere in terms of sensory 
stimulation and motor response, and balanced as much as possible by control conditions. A 
subtle issue is that animals, primates in particular, are notorious for finding the simplest strategy 
for accomplishing a task, rather than the strategy desired by the experimenter. It is important to 
verify that subjects are not “cheating” at metacognitive tasks by using external cues (e.g. visual 
differences between conditions or motor differences between responses) instead of internal 
perceptions and memories (see Kornell 2013 for a review). Taking all of these considerations 
into account, investigators have designed a variety of tasks for evaluating the association 
between neuronal activity and metacognition. All of the tasks to date consist of a “cognitive” 
period followed immediately by a “metacognitive” period. Likewise, all of them use a 
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confidence response or surrogate thereof. Though the single neuron studies we describe in this 
chapter do not attempt to investigate the richness of metacognitive skills that we take for granted 
as humans, they serve as a starting point for what hopefully will continue to develop into a 
mechanistic neuronal account of metacognition in general. 
We begin by describing the behavioral tasks used to test metacognition in animals, with a 
focus on those used in single neuron studies. Next we discuss a few possible ways neuronal 
firing rates might encode metacognitive processes. The bulk of the chapter is then devoted to 
describing and critiquing three studies that examined metacognitive processes at the single 
neuron level. Finally, we discuss the implications and limitations of these and future single 
neuron studies of metacognition in animals. 
 
Streamlined metacognitive paradigms: opt-out and betting tasks 
Before describing the tasks and experiments for studying the neuronal basis of metacognition, it 
is important to consider how the field arrived at this point. Before the term “metacognition” was 
used, experiments were performed in which subjects were asked to assess their own “feeling of 
knowing” whether an item was in their memory even though they could not presently recall it 
(Hart 1965). In the 1970s John Flavell coined the terms “metamemory” (Flavell 1971) and 
“metacognition” (Flavell 1976) in his studies of child development. Subsequently, Nelson and 
Narens (1990) developed a systematic framework for the study of metacognition that has been 
widely used since. In their framework, a distinction was made between two types of 
metacognitive processes. A ‘monitoring’ process receives information about ongoing cognitive 
operations. For example, a student might experience a sense of whether she is correctly recalling 
a list of memorized words. A ‘control’ process provides information to ongoing cognitive 
processes and allows a subject to strategically plan. For example, a student can estimate the 
effort it will take to memorize a list of words. Within these two main divisions, monitoring and 
control processes, Nelson and Narens’ framework provides multiple sub-categories that classify 
metacognitive processes according to factors such as which facet of a cognitive process is 
interacting with the metacognitive process, the responses required by the subject, and whether 
the response occurs while a subject is learning or recalling material. A main goal for the 
neuroscientific study of metacognition is to embrace these psychological principles while 
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adapting the tasks for use in non-verbal subjects (animals) in settings that demand speed and 
efficiency (single neuron recordings). 
Experiments to test animals’ metacognitive abilities have almost all focused on 
monitoring processes. In the 1990s David Smith and colleagues tested whether animals (dolphins 
in particular) could monitor their own uncertainty (Smith et al 1995) during decision-making. 
Variously referred to as “uncertainty monitoring”, “decline”, or “escape” tasks, we will refer to 
this general class as “opt-out” tasks (Fig 1a). Animals are required to perform a primary decision 
task, such as making a two-choice perceptual discrimination. Reward is earned for correct 
responses. On some trials, an additional “opt-out” response choice is offered that, when selected, 
always delivers minimal reward (most studies have offered the opt-out concurrent with the 
primary task response targets, but see Hampton 2001 for an important innovation in which the 
opt-out is presented before the animal responds to the primary task). The animal thus can opt-out 
of the primary task, which will earn either a large reward if correct or no reward if incorrect, and 
instead receive an ensured small reward. The basic premise is that an animal capable of 
monitoring its own uncertainty will select the opt-out response more often during difficult trials. 
Likewise, when the animal does make a response to the primary task, accuracy will be higher on 
trials in which the opt-out response was offered than those when the animal was forced to 
perform the primary task. Multiple species have been shown to opt-out in a manner consistent 
with the ability to monitor their uncertainty, including dolphins (Smith et al 1995), rats (Foote & 
Crystal 2007; Kepecs et al 2008), rhesus macaques (Shields et al 1997; Smith et al 1998; 
Figure 1: Metacognitive monitoring tasks. (a) Schematic of opt-out task paradigms. Opt-out tasks 
generally involve a two-choice perceptual discrimination. On some proportion of trials, a third opt-out 
target appears. Selection of the opt-out target results in a small but ensured reward. Participants utilizing 
a metacognitive strategy should select the opt-out target more often on more difficult trials, and make 
more accurate responses on trials the opt-out is offered. (b) Schematic of betting task paradigms. Betting 
tasks generally involve choice stage followed by a betting stage. Selection of the high bet target results in a 
large reward after a correct response, and no reward after an incorrect response. Selection of the low bet 
target results in a small but ensured reward. Participants using a metacognitive strategy should select the 
high bet target more often after correct decisions. Unlike opt-out tasks, betting tasks require a primary 
task decision on every trial. 
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Hampton 2001; Beran et al 2006; Kiani & Shadlen 2009; Tanaka & Funahashi 2013), orangutans 
(Suda-King 2008), and gorillas (Suda-King 2013).  
Another line of studies used what we refer to as “betting” tasks (Fig 1b). Like opt-out 
tasks, betting tasks require performance of a primary task, such as making a two-choice 
perceptual discrimination. However, a response to the primary task is required on every trial. 
Reward is not earned immediately. Instead, once a response is made, there is an option to make 
either a high bet or a low bet. High bets earn a large reward after correct decisions and no reward 
(or a timeout punishment) after incorrect decisions. Low bets earn a small but ensured reward 
following either correct or incorrect decisions. The premise is that animals able to monitor their 
own decisions will bet high more often after correct responses and bet low more often after 
incorrect responses. Rhesus macaques perform betting tasks in a manner that suggests they are 
able to monitor their ongoing cognitive operations (Shields et al 2005; Son & Kornell 2005; 
Kornell et al 2007; Middlebrooks & Sommer 2012). 
Comparative studies of metacognition sometimes use other tasks as well. For example, a 
series of experiments showed that gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and rhesus 
monkeys will seek information when it is needed to perform better on a task (Call & Carpenter 
2001; Hampton et al 2004; Call 2010; Beran & Smith 2011), a type of metacognitive control 
behavior. The field of comparative metacognition continues to grow and improve 
methodologically. But from a neuroscientific point of view, the relative simplicity of opt-out and 
betting tasks is attractive. Both tasks are rooted in one of the most successful fields of 
neuroscience: decision-making. It is not surprising, then, that the single neurons studies 
described below employed tasks adapted from previous behavioral opt-out and betting task 
studies.  
 
Mechanisms of metacognition 
Before we highlight the single neuron studies related to metacognition, it is worthwhile to 
consider some theoretical perspectives that propose what a metacognitive neuronal signal might 
look like. In what follows, we outline a few neuronal coding schemes that plausibly underlie 
metacognition. In keeping with the rest of this chapter, we frame our discussion within the 
context of opt-out and/or betting tasks, in which a metacognitive judgment is in temporal 
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proximity to its referent cognitive behavior (a decision). In principle, though, the mechanisms 
could apply to other metacognitive tasks with some modification.  
Researchers have approached the study of metacognition from decision-making sciences. 
The framework of decision-making can be extended to include how information in the signals 
that encode decisions could be used and/or further processed to encode related behavior, i.e. a 
metacognitive signal. Much of what we understand about how decisions are made, and especially 
how perceptual decisions are made, is encapsulated by a family of cognitive models known as 
sequential sampling models (Usher & McClelland 2001; Gold & Shadlen 2007; Smith & Ratcliff 
2009). Rooted in signal detection theory (Green & Sweats 1960), sequential sampling models 
posit that available perceptual evidence is repeatedly sampled until the amount of evidence 
reaches a criterion threshold. At that point an appropriate response is executed. Neuronal firing 
rates in many regions of the brain resemble what sequential sampling models predict. Neurons’ 
firing rates increase stochastically, at a rate proportional to available sensory evidence, until a 
consistent threshold is reached and a response is made. These regions include superior colliculus 
(Krauzlis & Dill 2002; Ratcliff et al 2003; Ratcliff et al 2007), lateral intraparietal cortex 
(Shadlen & Newsome 2001; Roitman & Shadlen 2002), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Kim & 
Shadlen 1999), the caudate nucleus (Ding & Gold 2010) and the frontal eye field (Hanes & 
Schall 1996; Purcell et al 2010; Ding & Gold 2012).  
Psychologists have long thought confidence may be encoded simultaneously with 
decisions (e.g. Peirce & Jastrow 1884; Vickers 1979; Heath 1984; Link 1992). After all, we 
usually experience a sense of how well we’re performing some task while in the middle of 
performing it. Building on that theme, various proposals have been made by which confidence in 
a decision could be encoded using the same mechanisms underlying the decision, at the same 
time the decision process occurs. In that case, brain regions encoding cognitive decisions could 
concurrently encode metacognitive decisions. 
One example proposes that a metacognitive signal is encoded by comparing the firing 
rates of neurons selective for the alternative responses in a decision task (Fig 2a). Consider two 
hypothetical neurons, each neuron selective for one of the two alternative responses. During any 
given trial, the firing rate of the neuron selective for the response that was chosen (Dc, solid 
black) will likely be different than (and usually exceed) the firing rate of the neuron selective for 
the un-chosen response (Du, dashed black). As the signals develop over the course of the trial, a 
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metacognitive signal could be computed at any time by taking the difference between the two 
decision signals (MC). The magnitude of the difference could guide the metacognitive behavior 
to make. A large difference would correlate with a high level of confidence, for example. During 
a different, more difficult trial (grey lines), the firing rates of the two neurons may differ less and 
thus lead to a lower confidence rating (MC’). Models of this nature have accounted for human 
confidence ratings (e.g. van Zandt 2000; Merkle & van Zandt 2006; de Martino et al 2012). 
A similar but alternate mechanism (Fig 2b) would compare firing rates of response 
selective neurons not with the firing rate of neurons selective for the other response, but with a 
threshold level representing the boundary between the alternative choices. During one trial 
(black line), a decision response (Dc) is made and the magnitude of the metacognitive signal 
(MC, black) is proportional to the difference between the neuron’s firing rate and the threshold 
(black dashed line). During a more difficult trial (grey line), the same decision response (Dc’) is 
Figure 2: Possible mechanisms of metacognition. (a) Comparison of decision-related activity between 
response alternatives. In this model, confidence (MC) is a function of the difference between neural activity 
for the chosen (Dc) and unchosen (Du) responses. (b) Comparison of decision-related activity to an 
independent threshold. In this model, confidence is a function of the difference between neural activity for the 
chosen response and the threshold. It is not dependent on activity for the unchosen response. (c) Sequential 
coding of decision and confidence. In this model, evidence continues to accumulate after the decision is made 
(Dc or Dc’) to subsequently produce a confidence response (MC or MC’, respectively). (d, e) Distinct coding of 
decision and confidence. In these models, confidence is encoded separately from the decision. Confidence can 
be encoded by the same neurons involved in the decision (d) or by distinct neurons (e). 
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made but with less confidence (MC’). A model of this kind was used to describe rat behavior in 
one of the single neurons studies described below (Kepecs et al 2008). 
The two mechanisms described assume that cognitive and metacognitive processes are 
encoded simultaneously within a brain area. An alternative proposal entails a sequence of 
processing stages within a single brain region, in which the metacognitive follows the cognitive 
process (Fig 2c). Like the previous models, this model exploits the sequential sampling 
framework. During a given trial (black line), evidence accumulates to a decision (Dc). The 
metacognitive process, however, depends on evidence continuing to accumulate until a 
metacognitive response is made (MC). During a different trial (grey line), the same decision may 
be made (Dc’), but further processing could lead to a higher confidence response (MC’). The 
stage processing mechanism accounts for human confidence responses (Pleskac & Busemeyer 
2010) and for changes of mind after a decision has been made (van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina 
2003). It should be noted that simultaneous and multi-stage models of metacognition are not 
mutually exclusive. A metacognitive process could be encoded in parallel with a cognitive 
process and after the cognitive process, and there is some evidence for such a scenario (Petrusic 
& Baranski 2003). In that study, humans’ decision response times (RTs) increased when the task 
required confidence responses, suggesting the metacognitive process interacted with the 
cognitive process. In addition, confidence response RTs varied with the confidence level 
reported, suggesting some post-decisional processing took place as well.  
So far we've considered extensions of the sequential sampling models that have enjoyed 
much success describing decision-making. The framework developed by Nelson and Narens 
(1990) suggests separate cognitive and metacognitive processes that interact via information 
flow, as described earlier. For opt-out and betting tasks, confidence in a given decision would be 
encoded separately from the decision. It is possible this could occur in one brain region, as 
illustrated in Fig 2d. The hypothetical neuronal firing rates encode the decision (Dc vs. Dc’) and 
later the metacognitive signal (MC vs. MC’). Alternatively, perhaps most closely aligned with 
the Nelson and Narens framework, the metacognitive signal could be encoded in a separate brain 
region than the cognitive signal (Fig 2e). If that were the case, one might observe little or no 
decision-related activity (Dc vs. Dc’). Instead, information about the decision would arrive from 
an external source, as for example a corollary discharge from the brain region encoding the 
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decision (Crapse & Sommer 2008; Sommer & Wurtz 2008). This copy of the information could 
be used to encode the metacognitive signal (MC vs. MC’). 
The mechanisms discussed are by no means exhaustive. Perhaps the most obvious 
alternative is to posit that metacognitive signals are not encoded by firing rates, but by a different 
signal. For example, neural oscillations could be used as a coding principle, affecting the 
correlated timing of spikes within a brain region and/or within a brain circuits across regions 
(Buzsaki 2006). Another possibility is that metacognitive signals are encoded by reading out 
some function of the variance of decision-related spiking neurons during a task (Yeung et al 
2012). Finally, the worst case scenario (or most interesting scenario, depending on one’s 
viewpoint) is that metacognition is represented along multiple dimensions of neuronal activity, 
including one, more than one, or all of the possibilities listed in this section. This is one reason 
that single neuron studies are so important. Different neurons within a brain region or between 
brain regions may in fact be encoding similar cognitive attributes in different ways. Methods that 
sample aggregate activity (e.g. fMRI, EEG) are unable to tease apart such variegated strategies 
for neuronal encoding. While single neuron recordings suffer from their own limitations (e.g. 
small sample sizes), they are exquisitely appropriate for discovering the coding mechanisms 
exploited by the brain for sensory, motor, or cognitive functions (Wurtz & Sommer 2006). 
 
Single neuron studies 
Metacognition has been studied only recently at the neuronal level in animals. Though many 
studies allow for the possibility of metacognition within their design, only three thus far have 
tested metacognitive processes specifically. By a metacognitive task, we mean one in which the 
activity of single neurons are correlated with, and therefore could be used for, monitoring a 
cognitive process and acting with respect to that process. A related field of study in neuroscience 
is so called “performance monitoring”, which correlates neuronal activity with trial outcomes 
and rewards (Stuphorn et al 2000). Performance monitoring signals have been shown to correlate 
with adjustments in performance, like changes in trial response times that depend on previous 
trial outcomes (e.g. Pouget et al 2011). But previous performance monitoring tasks were not 
designed to test whether information in the signals could be use to directly affect the outcome 
within a concurrent trial. Here we focus on studies in which animals were encouraged to use the 
monitoring information functionally. 
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Orbitofrontal cortex  Kepecs and 
colleagues (2008) examined neuronal 
correlates of confidence in rat 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), an area 
associated with reward, risk, and 
uncertainty (e.g. Hsu et al 2005; Tobler 
et al 2007; O'Neill & Schultz 2010). The 
rats performed an odor discrimination 
task, the goal of which was to report the 
majority component odor within a 
mixture of two odors (Fig 3a). Decisions 
were reported by poking their nose into 
one of two ports, one port for each odor. 
Reward was delivered after a brief delay 
if the decision was correct. As expected, 
rats made more correct decisions on easy 
trials, i.e. when the proportion of one 
odor dominated the other (Fig 3b).  
OFC neuronal activity was 
analyzed during a time when the rats 
would likely experience confidence in 
their decisions: after the decision had 
been made, while the rats waited for 
reward delivery. Firing rates varied as a 
function of trial difficulty (Fig 3c) and 
choice accuracy (Fig 3d). In the 
population of recorded neurons, many 
(21%, or 120/563) had higher firing rates 
during more difficult trials, like the 
example neuron in Fig 3c,d. Some had 
the opposite pattern, higher firing rates 
Figure 3: Confidence-related neural activity in rodent 
orbitofrontal cortex. (a) Rodents discriminated the majority 
odor component in a two-choice odor discrimination task. 
Decisions were reported by a nose-poke into one of two 
adjacent ports. (b) Rodents performed better when the one 
odor component dominated the other. (c) An example OFC 
neuron that had higher firing rates during more difficult 
trials. Firing rates were measured after the decision, while 
the rat waited for reward, (d) The same neuron had higher 
firing rates after less accurate decisions. (e, f) Activity of an 
example OFC neuron differentiated between correct 
decisions and errors. This difference was greater and 
appeared sooner on easier trials (f) than harder trials (e). (g, 
h) Population activity differentiated between correct 
decisions and errors. The patterns seen in (e, f) are 
conserved in a subpopulation of neurons (66/563). Adapted 
with permission, from Kepecs et al 2007. 
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during easier trials (12%, 66/563). Further, many neurons differentiated between correct and 
incorrect decisions within a single level of difficulty. Most had higher firing rates during 
incorrect than correct trials, like an example neuron during relatively difficult trials (Fig 3e) and 
during easier trials (Fig 3f). The neuron’s firing rate began to distinguish correct from incorrect 
choices before the decision was made, and sustained the signal throughout reward anticipation 
and reward delivery. This pattern of activity was evident across the subpopulation of neurons 
with higher firing rates for incorrect choices (Fig 3g,h). Another subpopulation of neurons had 
the opposite pattern- higher firing rates during correct choices (not shown). 
The OFC neuron signals could encode confidence in the decisions, and are consistent 
with mechanisms in Fig 2a-c. However, the rats were not required to behave in a metacognitive 
fashion. To assess the rats' confidence in their decisions, the authors added a manipulation to the 
experiment. Once a rat poked its nose into a port, a random delay was imposed before reward 
delivery after a correct decision (as before no reward was delivered after an incorrect decision). 
The rats could endure the wait and earn reward (or risk waiting longer for no reward), or they 
could abort the trial and immediately start the next trial. Thus the task was a hybrid between an 
opt-out and a betting task. The rats’ behaved as if they experienced varying levels of confidence. 
They waited longer for reward after an easy correct trial than a difficult correct trial, and 
conversely after errors they aborted more often when the error was made on an easy trial than on 
a difficult trial. OFC neurons were not recorded during the delayed-reward trials, so we must 
cautiously assume the neuronal activity during the modified task was similar to that during the 
original task (which is not a fail-safe assumption; see Petrusic & Baranski 2003). Instead Kepecs 
et al (2008) offered two models, like Figures 2a and 2b, in which confidence was encoded 
simultaneously with the decision. The models correctly predicted the animals’ behavior during 
the delayed-reward (opt-out version) trials and matched the pattern of OFC firing rates from 
recordings made during the initial discrimination task. 
In sum, rat OFC neurons recorded during an odor discrimination task carried signals that 
could be used to make metacognitive judgments about the decisions. When the rats were 
subjected to a modified version of the task that encouraged metacognitive behavior, their 
performance was consistent with experiencing varying degrees of confidence. Models provided a 
link between neuronal activity during the discrimination task and performance during the 
metacognitive task. 
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Lateral intraparietal cortex  Kiani and Shadlen (2009) used an opt-out task and recorded single 
neurons in rhesus macaque lateral intraparietal (LIP) cortex, an area implicated in visuo-spatial 
cognition, attention, and decision-making (Colby et al 1996; Gottlieb et al 1998; Shadlen & 
Newsome, 2001). Monkeys were trained to discriminate the motion direction of a visual display 
of randomly moving dots that had overall coherence in one direction (Fig 4a). During an initial 
fixation period, targets appeared in the periphery. A patch of moving dots appeared briefly then 
disappeared, followed by a delay, and then a cue to make a response. Trial difficulty varied with 
the overall motion strength of the moving dots and with the duration that the moving dots 
appeared. On half of the trials, a response to the stimulus was required, by making an eye 
movement in the same direction the dots appeared to be moving. (Fig 4a, lower panels). Reward 
was delivered after correct decisions. On the other half of trials, an opt-out response was offered 
after the moving dots stimulus disappeared, called the “sure target”. If chosen it ensured a small 
reward (Fig 4a, upper panels). 
When offered the sure target, the likelihood of choosing it increased with trial difficulty 
(Fig 4b). In addition, more accurate responses were made on trials when the sure target was 
offered but a motion stimulus target was chosen than on trials when the monkey was forced to 
choose a motion stimulus target (Fig 4c, closed circles are trials with sure target present, open 
circles are forced-choice trials). Thus the monkeys optimized reward by choosing the sure target 
when the probability of being correct was low, performance consistent with experiencing less 
confidence (more uncertainty) on those trials. 
  LIP activity varied as a function of choosing the sure target or one of the motion targets, 
illustrated by an example neuron (Fig. 4d). During forced-choice trials (left), while the monkey 
viewed the moving dots, the neuron’s firing rate increased on trials when the target in the 
response field was the correct motion stimulus target (black line) relative to the incorrect target 
(grey line). These signals were maintained until a saccade was made to a target, similar to many 
previous reports of LIP neurons during the dots task (e.g. Roitman & Shadlen 2002). In trials 
when the sure target was offered, firing rates were again high or low when one of the motion 
targets was chosen (Fig 4d right panel, solid black and gray lines). When the sure target was 
chosen, however, the neuron’s firing rates were intermediate (dashed black and gray lines). Thus 
varying levels of firing rates were suggested to correlate with the monkeys' confidence. This 
same pattern of activity was evident across the population of 70 LIP neurons (Fig 4e). 
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 Figure 4: Confidence-related neural activity in macaque lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP). (a) 
Opt-out task schematic. Monkeys had to discriminate the motion direction of a random dot-
motion stimulus. Decisions were reported by a saccade to one of two peripheral targets. On some 
trials, a third “sure target” appeared after the motion stimulus but before the animal was 
permitted to respond. (b) Subjects were more likely to select the sure target when stimulus 
presentation time was shorter and overall motion coherence was lower. (c) Subjects also 
performed better on trials in which the sure target was offered than on trials in which there was 
no sure target. (d) Activity of an example LIP neuron varied with the decision to choose one of the 
direction targets or the sure target. In trials without sure target (left), the cell was more active 
when the direction target in its receptive field was selected (black line) than when the alternate 
target was selected (grey line). In trials with sure target (right), activity corresponding to its 
selection was intermediate (dashed lines). (e) This same pattern of activity was found in a 
population of 70 LIP neurons. Adapted with permission from Kiani and Shadlen 2009. 
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Kiani and Shadlen (2009) concluded, as did Kepecs et al. (2008), that confidence was 
encoded along with the decision-related signal, manifested as graded levels of that signal. The 
authors likewise modeled their data using a sequential sampling framework. Response to the sure 
target depended on a dynamic threshold of neuronal activity throughout the trial, the level of 
which was set as a function of prior likelihoods of choosing the correct motion target. The LIP 
neuronal data and model therefore, like the rat OFC activity, are consistent with the mechanisms 
proposed in Fig 2a and 2b. 
 
Frontal eye field, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and supplementary eye field Middlebrooks and 
Sommer (2012) carried out the most recent single neuron study of metacognition. A betting task 
(Fig 1b) was used, inspired by previous behavioral experiments that tested monkeys’ 
metacognitive skills (Shields et al 2005; Kornell et al 2007).  
Each trial consisted of a decision stage and a subsequent bet stage (Fig 5a). The goal of 
the decision stage was to detect the location of a red target square. The trial began by fixating a 
central spot. A red target appeared randomly at one of four possible locations, then after a 
varying delay white mask stimuli appeared at all four locations. A correct decision was reported 
by making a saccade to the location where the target appeared, and an incorrect decision was a 
saccade to one of the other locations. Difficulty varied as a function of the delay between the 
target and mask appearance, known as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). Immediately after a 
decision was made, a new fixation spot appeared in the center of the screen to begin the bet stage. 
The goal of the bet stage was to make a bet regarding whether the decision was correct. Once the 
new fixation spot was obtained, two bet targets appeared in the periphery- a red high bet target 
and a green low bet target. The monkey placed a bet by making a saccade to one of the bet 
targets. Reward was earned based on the conjunction of decision responses and bets. A correct 
decision followed by a high bet (CH: correct-high) earned maximum reward, and an incorrect 
decision followed by a high bet (IH: incorrect-high) earned a brief timeout punishment. Low bets 
earned minimal juice rewards regardless of the decision (CL and IL: correct- and incorrect-low). 
Thus a metacognitive strategy would maximize reward: bet high after correct decisions and bet 
low after incorrect decisions. 
There are a few noteworthy differences between the betting task and the tasks described 
above. First, each trial requires both a decision and a bet. The moving dots opt-out task (Fig 4a)  
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Figure 5: Confidence-related neural activity in macaque supplementary eye field (SEF). (a) Betting task 
schematic. During the decision stage of the task, the goal was to detect the location of a red target. The red 
target appeared at one of four locations, and white mask stimuli appeared at all four locations after a brief 
delay (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA). Decisions were reported by a saccade to one of the four masks. 
After a decision, the animal regained fixation to begin the bet stage. During the bet stage a high bet target 
and a low bet target appeared in the periphery, and the monkey made a saccade to one of the bet targets. 
(b) Decision accuracy and the proportion of high bets increased as task difficulty decreased (left panel, 
greater SOA values correspond to easier target detection). On trial-by-trial basis, high bets were 
correlated with correct decisions regardless of trial difficulty (right panel, phi correlations greater than 
zero indicated correlated decisions and bets) (c) Activity in an example SEF neuron varied with the 
likelihood of choosing the high bet after correct decisions. (d) This pattern of activity was conserved in a 
population of 14 SEF neurons. Adapted with permission from Middlebrooks and Sommer 2012. 
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required a single response (a decision or an opt-out), so neuronal activity related to a decision is 
potentially complicated during trials in which the animal opted out. The odor discrimination task 
(Fig 3a) is more similar to the betting task by requiring a decision response each trial followed 
by either an action (abort trial to restart) or no action (wait for reward). However, by requiring a 
saccadic bet on each trial, trials can be compared in which identical behaviors can result in 
alternative outcomes, controlling for behavior as a possible explanation of neuronal activity. 
Another difference between tasks involves the type of perceptual decisions required.  The 
decision stage of the betting task required detection of a stimulus. In contrast, the odor 
discrimination and the moving dots tasks both required discrimination of a stimulus. The subtle 
difference may serve better to separate decision related signals from metacognitive signals. 
During discrimination tasks, perceptual evidence is thought to accumulate in neuronal activity 
over time until a decision is reached. This approach has provided rich contributions to 
understanding how decisions are made in the brain (Gold & Shadlen 2007; Smith & Ratcliff 
2009). It is possible though that signals related to the evolving perceptual evidence overlap with 
signals related to metacognition. Although this complication is not an issue when analyzing 
neuronal activity well after a decision (like the OFC activity during the odor discrimination task), 
it may affect interpretation of signals early during the task (like the LIP activity of the moving 
dots task). Using a detection task, involving a brief pulse of sensory information on which to 
base a decision, provides separation between perceptual and metacognitive signals, thus 
untangling them. 
The monkeys’ performance during the betting task indicated they used a metacognitive 
strategy. During the decision stage, target detection varied as expected with trial difficulty- 
correct decisions increased as a function of SOAs (Fig 5b, left panel). Bets also varied with trial 
difficulty- high bets increase as a function of SOA. This overall pattern, the tendency to bet high 
on trials more likely to bet correct was expected if the animals monitored their decisions. But it 
also could result from a probabilistic betting strategy based solely on the difficulty of the 
decisions. If so, high bets on average would parallel correct decisions (and low bets would 
parallel incorrect decisions), but on a trial-by-trial basis high (low) bets might not follow correct 
(incorrect) decisions. To ensure the monkeys adopted a metacognitive betting strategy, a trial-by-
trial analysis confirmed that high bets mostly followed correct decisions and low bets mostly 
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followed incorrect decisions, regardless of trial difficulty (Fig 5b, right panel). Thus, monkeys 
accurately monitored their decisions to make appropriate bets. 
Neurons were recorded in three separate cortical regions: the frontal eye field (FEF), 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and the supplementary eye field (SEF). The decision stage 
of the task was inspired by previous reverse masking tasks in which FEF neuron firing rates 
varied with monkeys’ ability to detect the target (Thompson & Schall 1999, 2000). FEF is 
involved in oculomotor behavior (Bruce & Goldberg 1985), higher-level processes like attention 
(Moore & Fallah 2001), and is known to send copies of eye movement signals to other brain 
areas (Crapse & Sommer 2008, Sommer & Wurtz 2008). Middlebrooks and Sommer (2012) 
reasoned that FEF activity might also vary with monkeys’ processing of the decision stage to 
guide a subsequent metacognitive bet. For similar reasons, neurons in PFC and SEF were 
recorded. PFC has been implicated in a range of high-level cognition, like working memory 
(Funahashi et al 1989), decision-making (Kim & Shadlen 1999), and goal-driven behavior (Tanji 
& Hoshi 2008). SEF, in addition to having activity related to visual processing and oculomotor 
behavior (Schlag & Schlag-Rey 1987; Schall 1991), has a known role in so-called performance 
monitoring- signals related to errors, response conflicts, and rewards (Stuphorn et al 2000). 
Performance monitoring signals produced during the decision stage could be used to encode an 
upcoming bet.  
Neuronal firing rates were first analyzed with respect to decision outcomes during the 
task, regardless of subsequent bets. Early during the decision stage, when sensory evidence about 
target location might be encoded, all three cortical regions’ neuronal firing rates were modulated 
with decision accuracy. During the planning, execution, and immediate aftermath of the saccadic 
response, only SEF firing rates were modulated. FEF and PFC neurons were active and task-
related, but did not differentiate correct and incorrect decisions (Schall & Hanes, 1996, e.g.). In 
short, as expected, neuronal activity in each brain region varied with decision accuracy. 
To test whether neurons in these regions were involved in monitoring decisions, neuronal 
firing rates were compared between the conjunctions of decision and bet outcomes- the 
metacognitive processes. If neurons encoded the accuracy of monitoring decisions, a prediction 
would be that their firing rates would be modulated between trials in which different bets were 
made after having made the same (correct or incorrect) decision. Trial outcomes were thus 
divided to compare CH vs. CL and to compare IH vs. IL trials.  
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Of the three cortical regions tested, SEF seemed most involved in metacognitive 
processing. There were neurons in SEF that differentiated CH and CL trials (15%, or 20/133) 
and neurons that differentiated IH and IL trials (8%, or 10/133). An example neuron that had 
higher firing rates for CH than CL trials is shown in Fig 5c. Firing rates for CH and CL outcomes 
are shown throughout the trial. The signals diverge quickly after the target appears (before the 
decision has been made), reach a peak difference between the decision stage and the bet stage, 
and maintain a difference through the betting stage. The example neuron was typical of the 
population that had CH firing rates greater than CL (Fig 5d). In general, SEF activity during the 
betting task provided more support that metacognitive processes could be encoded concomitant 
with and in the same brain region as cognitive processes.  
 
Discussion 
What do we know about the neuronal basis of metacognition? As attested by the studies 
described above, it is too early in this burgeoning field to make definitive claims about how 
neuronal activity translates into metacognitive behavior. Neurons in LIP, OFC, and SEF all had 
firing rates that varied with metacognitive behavior. There is no way to tell whether the neuronal 
activity was necessary for the metacognitive behavior, however, because none of the studies used 
causal manipulations. Microstimulation techniques and reversible inactivation or lesions of brain 
regions are needed to provide evidence that any region plays a causal role. A caveat to such 
approach however, is that it may be difficult to ascribe effects solely to metacognitive processing 
if the same brain regions are encoding the cognitive processes.   
A major challenge facing single neuron metacognition research is the extent to which 
animal models of metacognition apply to human metacognition. It seems likely, based on the 
success of opt-out tasks, that many animals experience some measure of confidence along with 
the decisions they make. It also seems likely, based on betting tasks, that some animals keep 
track of the accuracy of their decisions, at least over short period of times. It is an open question 
whether these behaviors occur naturally in the environment or are a product of nurturing 
rudimentary metacognitive abilities by extensive laboratory training.  
The relative simplicity and streamlined design of the tasks described above has 
advantages and disadvantages. Each task used a metacognitive component temporally yoked to 
the cognitive component. Notable advantages of this task design are the abilities to observe the 
19	  	  
dynamics of neuronal activity within a single trial, and to interpret the signals within the context 
of the large body of knowledge in decision-making neuroscience. A disadvantage is that they do 
not capture the complexity we traditionally associate with human metacognitive processes, 
which can refer to events many years in the past or even potential events years in the future. It 
will be a challenge for future animal studies to tap into more complex forms of metacognition. 
 All three studies in this chapter reported neuronal signals consistent with an account of 
metacognition being encoded in near simultaneity and in the same brain region as the referent 
cognitive process (Fig2a-b). None reported signals that clearly support Nelson and Narens’ 
(1990) framework, in which a metacognitive process is distinct from and monitors or controls a 
cognitive process. One explanation is that the limited scope of metacognitive behaviors tested, 
confidence and uncertainty in perceptual processes, falls short of complexity that would require 
distinct circuits. Though we generally refer to metacognition as if it were a single process, it is 
more likely to encompass multiple functions that require various brain circuits (e.g. Gigerenzer 
et al 1991; Juslin & Olson 1997), depending on the cognitive processes involved and the nature 
of the task. Thus there may be systems yet discovered that encode metacognitive processes in a 
way more compatible with Nelson and Narens’ framework.  
It should also be noted that even if metacognitive signals reported are directly available 
from the cognitive signals, they are not instantaneously available. Instead, most proposed 
mechanisms require some computation to read out the metacognitive signal, whether it’s a 
comparison between two neurons’ firing rates (Fig 2a), or a comparison between one neuron’s 
firing rate and a signal representing a threshold from memory, etc. Therefore the results of the 
single neuron studies do not rule out separate cognitive and metacognitive systems. In Nelson 
and Narens’ framework, information is proposed to flow between the metacognitive and 
cognitive processors. Information in the brain, in the form of actions potential patterns, flows at 
the millisecond time scale. Hence cognitive and metacognitive processes could easily overlap in 
time and location. 
An important point to consider is that metacognitive judgments may dissociate from 
cognitive performance. In other words, the monitoring or control of cognitive information 
(metacognition) is likely based on reduced-fidelity versions of that information. This occurs in 
healthy individuals but is worsened in some neuropsychiatric disorders (see the chapters in the 
Neuropsychiatric disorders of metacognition section). One possible source for these 
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metacognitive “errors” is inaccurate transformations/computations during the readout of 
decision-related signals. This is consistent with an account of metacognitive judgments that 
depend primarily on accurate translation of cognitive signals. Another potential source of error is 
misinterpretation of external cues like familiarity with task stimuli, consistent with metacognitive 
judgments derived from sources outside the cognitive signals (Kornell 2013). These potential 
sources of error are not mutually exclusive, as metacognitive judgments could be affected by 
both factors. 
A related issue is that studying high level processes at the single neuron level presents the 
inherent difficulty of interpreting what is actually represented in the neuronal signals. Because 
metacognition can involve so many other cognitive processes, one might expect multiplexed 
information in the neuronal firing rates. Each of the three described studies addressed this issue 
and ruled out some alternative accounts of the neuronal signals. Thus, cognitive functions like 
risk assessment and reward-related processing did not explain the neuronal activity overall. 
However, it is unknown how much these and other processes, like attention, might contribute 
from trial to trial. It is important to consider these issues moving forward. 
As interesting as it is that some cortical regions were involved in metacognitive processes, 
it is also interesting that others were not. Specifically, neither FEF nor PFC neurons varied with 
metacognitive performance. The simplest interpretation is that these regions are not part of the 
circuit that mediates metacognition. Another possibility is that metacognition is implemented by 
some other coding scheme than firing rates. For example, variation in coherence of action 
potential timing among pools of neurons may contribute to metacognitive processes (e.g. Lisman 
& Jensen 2013; Nikolic et al 2013). Lastly, perhaps FEF and PFC do not contribute to the 
specific type of task used but may contribute when other facets of metacognition are tested.  
In conclusion, the study of metacognition at the level of single neurons has been 
productive. With further refinement of animal-specific tasks and more detailed surveys of task-
related signals across brain areas and species, single neuron data should continue to complement 
and inform the growing body of research on human metacognition.  
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1: Metacognitive monitoring tasks. (a) Schematic of opt-out task paradigms. Opt-out 
tasks generally involve a two-choice perceptual discrimination. On some proportion of trials, a 
third opt-out target appears. Selection of the opt-out target results in a small but ensured reward. 
Participants utilizing a metacognitive strategy should select the opt-out target more often on 
more difficult trials, and make more accurate responses on trials the opt-out is offered. (b) 
Schematic of betting task paradigms. Betting tasks generally involve choice stage followed by a 
betting stage. Selection of the high bet target results in a large reward after a correct response, 
and no reward after an incorrect response. Selection of the low bet target results in a small but 
ensured reward. Participants using a metacognitive strategy should select the high bet target 
more often after correct decisions. Unlike opt-out tasks, betting tasks require a primary task 
decision on every trial. 
 
Figure 2: Possible mechanisms of metacognition. (a) Comparison of decision-related activity 
between response alternatives. In this model, confidence (MC) is a function of the difference 
between neural activity for the chosen (Dc) and unchosen (Du) responses. (b) Comparison of 
decision-related activity to an independent threshold. In this model, confidence is a function of 
the difference between neural activity for the chosen response and the threshold. It is not 
dependent on activity for the unchosen response. (c) Sequential coding of decision and 
confidence. In this model, evidence continues to accumulate after the decision is made (Dc or 
Dc’) to subsequently produce a confidence response (MC or MC’, respectively). (d, e) Distinct 
coding of decision and confidence. In these models, confidence is encoded separately from the 
decision. Confidence can be encoded by the same neurons involved in the decision (d) or by 
distinct neurons (e). 	  
Figure 3: Confidence-related neural activity in rodent orbitofrontal cortex. (a) Rodents 
discriminated the majority odor component in a two-choice odor discrimination task. Decisions 
were reported by a nose-poke into one of two adjacent ports. (b) Rodents performed better when 
the one odor component dominated the other. (c) An example OFC neuron that had higher firing 
rates during more difficult trials. Firing rates were measured after the decision, while the rat 
waited for reward, (d) The same neuron had higher firing rates after less accurate decisions. (e, f) 
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Activity of an example OFC neuron differentiated between correct decisions and errors. This 
difference was greater and appeared sooner on easier trials (f) than harder trials (e). (g, h) 
Population activity differentiated between correct decisions and errors. The patterns seen in (e, f) 
are conserved in a subpopulation of neurons (66/563). Adapted with permission from Kepecs et 
al (2007). 
 
Figure 4: Confidence-related neural activity in macaque lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP). (a) 
Opt-out task schematic. Monkeys had to discriminate the motion direction of a random dot-
motion stimulus. Decisions were reported by a saccade to one of two peripheral targets. On some 
trials, a third “sure target” appeared after the motion stimulus but before the animal was 
permitted to respond. (b) Subjects were more likely to select the sure target when stimulus 
presentation time was shorter and overall motion coherence was lower. (c) Subjects also 
performed better on trials in which the sure target was offered than on trials in which there was 
no sure target. (d) Activity of an example LIP neuron varied with the decision to choose one of 
the direction targets or the sure target. In trials without sure target (left), the cell was more active 
when the direction target in its receptive field was selected (black line) than when the alternate 
target was selected (grey line). In trials with sure target (right), activity corresponding to its 
selection was intermediate (dashed lines). (e) This same pattern of activity was found in a 
population of 70 LIP neurons. Adapted with permission from Kiani and Shadlen (2009). 
 
Figure 5: Confidence-related neural activity in macaque supplementary eye field (SEF). (a) 
Betting task schematic. During the decision stage of the task, the goal was to detect the location 
of a red target. The red target appeared at one of four locations, and white mask stimuli appeared 
at all four locations after a brief delay (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA). Decisions were 
reported by a saccade to one of the four masks. After a decision, the animal regained fixation to 
begin the bet stage. During the bet stage a high bet target and a low bet target appeared in the 
periphery, and the monkey made a saccade to one of the bet targets. (b) Decision accuracy and 
the proportion of high bets increased as task difficulty decreased (left panel, greater SOA values 
correspond to easier target detection). On trial-by-trial basis, high bets were correlated with 
correct decisions regardless of trial difficulty (right panel, phi correlations greater than zero 
indicated correlated decisions and bets) (c) Activity in an example SEF neuron varied with the 
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likelihood of choosing the high bet after correct decisions. (d) This pattern of activity was 
conserved in a population of 14 SEF neurons. Adapted with permission from Middlebrooks and 
Sommer (2012). 
